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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES H. BECKSTROM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
PAUL WILLIAMS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8027 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
This was an action brought by plaintiff against the 
defendant for damages for personal injuries and for 
property damage as a result of a collision between a 
tractor on which plaintiff was riding and the truck 
driven by the defendant on August 3, 1951 near the 
Benjamin Crossroads in Benjamin, Utah County, Utah. 
The defendant, Paul Williams, filed a counterclaim for 
damages to his motor vehicle and for personal injuries. 
The case was tried to a jury commencing on F'ebruary 
16, 1953 and concluding on February 17, 1953, with the 
Hon. R. L. Tuckett, Judge, presiding. The jury returned 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
verdicts of no cause of action on plaintiff's complaint 
and also on defendant's counterclaim. The appeal is 
taken by the plaintiff from the verdict of the jury no 
cau8e oi' action on plaintiff's complaint. 
srrATEMENT OF FACT 
rl,he accident out of which this action arose occurred 
on August 3, 1951 at about 4:30P.M. on a highway known 
as state road No. 228 which runs north and south in 
Benjamin, Ctah County, [tah. The point of the accident 
was just north of the point known as Benjamin Cross-
roads. The hard surface portion of the highway in the 
vicinity of where the accident occurred ranges from 21 
to :22 feet wide so that it would be from 10¥2 to 11 feet 
each side of the center of the highway (R. 186). At the 
point where the accident occurred there is a private lane 
leading from the home of Arch Beckstrom, a brother of 
the plaintiff, which said driveway as it comes from the 
yard of the Beckstrom home crosses over a culvert. The 
driveway at that point is approximately 25 feet wide, 
the culvert extending some distance beyond the 25 foot 
width of the private driveway (R. 186). The tractor on 
which the plaintiff was sitting at the time the collision 
occurred was a John Deere Model A tractor, having a 
weight of 5, 046 lbs. (R. 177). The tractor has an overall 
length of 11112 feet; the driver's seat was at the extreme 
rear, between the rear wheels, it being 11 feet from the 
rear of the driver's seat to the front of the tractor and 
9 feet from the front of the seat to the front of the 
tractor front wheel. The rear wheels were 5 feet in 
diameter. From the steering wheel to the front of th~ 
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tractor hood is 7 feet 6 in. ( R. 49-50). 
At the tune the collision occurred there was a heavy 
growth of weeds, willows and trees along the fence line 
and barrow pit on the west side of the road and particu-
larly extending along said side of the road north from 
the driveway. 
Just prior to the accident the plaintiff Beckstrom 
had gone in to the yard of the Arch Beckstrom home 
and hooked a side-delivery rake onto the tractor. He 
then proceeded to pull said side-delivery rake with said 
tractor out of the driveway of the Beckstrom yard and 
onto the highway, his intention being to turn north after 
he got onto the highway. After he passed his brother's 
house, which is near the fence line, he stopped and 
checked his equipn1ent. He then started out again and 
was just creeping along, barely moving, as he started 
out of the driveway and onto the highway. He could 
not see down the highway until he had got outside and 
beyond the fence line on account of the high weeds and 
trees that were along the fence line and ditch bank (R. 
50). Plaintiff stated that as he was crossing over the 
culvert which is at the fence line, he was practically to 
a stop ; that he was just creeping along at not more than 
1 mile to llf2 miles per hour ( R. 50-51). There is no 
evidence whatsoever in the entire record that the plain-
tiff was at any time prior to the collision, nor at the 
time of the collision, travelling more than llf2 miles per 
hour. His testimony as to that speed is the only evidence 
in the record concerning the speed of the tractor. As 
soon as the plaintiff got far enough beyond the fence 
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line whPn• he could see, he looked up and down the road. 
II e could not see anything coming from the south, but 
Itt~ could see the truck coming from the north toward 
him, at a !"!J<'<'d which he estimated to be around 45 or 
;>o tuilP~ per hour (It 51-52). At the time he could first 
look do\\'n thP highway and could first see the defendant's 
tru<'k approa<·lting from the north, the plaintiff in his 
position sitting on the tractor seat and leaning forward 
would have heen about 10 feet beyond the fence line (R. 
51), and the front wheel of plaintiff's tractor was almost 
to the west edge of the hard surfaced portion of the 
highway (R. 51). At that time the plaintiff estimated 
that the defendant's truck was about 300 to 325 feet north 
of him (R. 51). The plaintiff's own words as to what 
he did immediately when he saw the defendant's truck 
coming at a distance of about 325 feet were as follows: 
"I shut off the gas and throwed it into neutral 
and it kind of - there is a little swale down 
through there and it kind of coasted down, and I 
jumped up and shut off the gas and throwed it 
into neutral and pulled on the brake. I pulled 
on the hand clutch, it serves as sort of a brake 
on the tractor, and it came to rest with the front 
wheels just out on the highway." (R. 52). 
He further stated that he applied the foot brake 
and the hand brake and stood with his foot on the foot 
brake to hold the tractor at a complete stop (R. 74-75). 
Plaintiff stated that at the time the tractor came to 
rest the front wheels were about 5 feet out onto the hard 
surface of the highway, which would place them about 
5 feet west of the center line of the highway (R. 52). 
4 
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He stated that by the time the trador was brought to 
a stop in the position indicated, the defendant's truck 
was approximately 1:25 feet frmn the tractor. When 
asked what he then did, he stated: 
"\Yell, I was practically helpless, I held the 
brake on and I was wondering all the time why-
I was expecting this truck to either stop or make 
a turn because he had room enough to get out 
. around me. I was standing there on the platform, 
I didn't have any ti1ne to back up and put it in 
any other gears, I just stood there wondering 
why he didn't make an effort of smne kind to 
make a turn or stop." (R. 53). 
The truck of the defendant continued on and struck 
the tractor of the plaintiff broadside, the truck hitting 
the tractor between the front and back wheels. The 
impact knocked the two and a half ton tractor about 
30 or 40 feet south straight along the edge of the high-
way, the two vehicles being stuck together as they came 
to a stop ( R. 54). The tractor tire marks as it was 
pushed along the edge of the highway sideways went 
straight south (R. 98). There were no tire marks at all 
except those made by the tractor as it was pushed side-
ways (R. 98), and there were no tire marks at all north 
of the point of impact (R. 98). 
There was testimony that at the time the defendant's 
truck passed the Bingham home about between 450 and 
600 feet north of the point of collision, the truck was 
travelling between 40 and 60 miles per hour (R. 104). 
The testimony of both James R. Bingham and Alpheus 
Bingham was that from the road in front of their home, 
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approximately 450 to 600 feet north of the accident, they 
eould look down the road and clearly see the vehicles 
wlu·re they had collided and that the vision was good (R. 
104-105, 111). They stated that the back wheels of the 
tra<"tor as it came to rest after the collision were just off 
the highway, and that the marks from the tractor wheels 
went Htraight south along the edge of the highway (R. 
I o;, ). 'l'he defendant stated that he first noticed the trac-
tor when he was about 65 feet from the point of impact 
(R. 152). When he first noticed the tractor, he did not 
just notice the front wheels emerging from behind the 
bushes or brush, but noticed the whole tractor (R. 161). 
'11he defendant said when he first saw the tractor when 
he came down the highway, it was about 2 or 3 feet west 
of the oiled portion of the west side of the highway, 
travelling east (R. 150), and he believed the tractor 
moved 5 or 6 feet from the time he saw it until the time 
of the impact (R. 162). He estimated his speed at the 
time of the impact was about 40 miles per hour (R. 148). 
He stated he was able to apply his brakes before the 
accident and did apply them and felt them take hold 
( R. 151), but the evidence is undisputed that there was 
no physical evidence on the highway of any brake marks 
from the defendant's truck. Exhibits A, B, C and D are 
photographs taken of the scene of the accident and the 
vicinity thereof. Exhibit A is a photograph of the high-
way looking from north to south and sh'owing the drive-
way from which the plaintiff's tractor entered the high-
way. Said driveway is indicated by an automobile stand-
ing on the culvert and across the fence line of the drive-
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way. rrhe telephone pole which is shown in the picture 
north of the driYeway is 100 feet north of the point of 
impact (R. 87). Exhibit B is a photograph taken from 
the extre1ne north edge of the driveway and shows the 
road looking from tl1e driyeway at the fence line as one 
looks north. Exhibit C is a photograph taken looking 
north along the highway from a point south of the drive-
way. Exhibit D is a photograph taken from the point 
on the highway where the plaintiff Beckstrom believed 
the defendant's truck was when he first saw it. This 
picture also shows the position of the tractor on the 
highway at the tin1e when Beckstrom first saw the 
defendant's truck approaching (R. 91). 
Plaintiff requested that the court submit to the 
jury instructions embodying the doctrine of the last 
clear chance. The court refused to submit such instruc-
tions to the jury or to permit the jury to consider such 
doctrine. 
STATEMENT OF· POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DOCTRINE OF LAST 
CLEAR CHANCE, AND IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TIONS NOS. 10, 13, 14 EMBODYING THE LAW AS IT 
RELATES TO THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO. 11 AS REGARDS THE DUTY OF A PERSON 
MOVING A TRACTOR ONTO THE HIGHWAY. 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE 
PLAINTIFF TO INTRODUCE THE EVIDENCE BY THE 
WITNESS KENNETH J .. TANNER AS TO THE STATEMENT 
MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE PRESENCE OF SAID 
TANNER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE COLLISION, 
WITH REGARD TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ACCI-
DENT OCCURRED AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING 
THAT SUCH STATEMENT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF AND INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE IMPEACHING TESTIMONY OF OFFICER 
BEARDALL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DOCTRINE OF LAST 
CLEAR CHANCE, AND IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC- I'-.:, 
TIONS NOS. 10, 13, 14 EMBODYING THE LAW AS IT 
RELATES TO THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
It is our position that the evidence in this case 
clearly brings the matter within the doctrine of last 
clear chance and that the plaintiff was entitled to have 
the case submitted to the jury under his theory and to 
have the jury consider the evidence under instructions 
with regard to the doctrine of last clear chance. We do 
not believe it necessary to discuss in detail the numerous 
cases involving consideration of the doctrine of last 
clear chance by the Utah courts, because each case 
involving the application or non-application of such 
doctrine stands peculiarly on its own set of facts. The 
only thing that need be considered is as to what rules 
are applicable, as related to the doctrine of last clear 
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ehanet> under the deeisions of this eourt, and to t ht>n 
apply such rule8< to the facts and eYidt>neP pre~Pnh•d in 
this ease. 
One of the later eases decided hy the Supre1ne Court 
of the State of Utah and wherein the Court sets forth 
the rules and requisites necessary to bring the case 
within the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, is the case of 
Compton r. Ogden Union Railzcay & Depot Co., 235 Pac. 
(2d) 515. In that case, as in numerous other cases (See 
Andersen z·. Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co., 21-1 Pac. (2d) 
607; Holmgren v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 198 Pac. 
(2d) -±59; Jlorby v. Rogers, 252 Pac. (2d) 231) our 
Supreme Court has stated that the case law in Utah 
gives approval to the rule promulgated by the American 
Law Institute Restatement of Torts, Volume II, Sections 
479 and· 480, as being the law of this State. Section 479 
of the Restatement of Torts reads as follows: 
"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected 
himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's 
. subsequent negligence may recover for harm 
caused thereby, if immediately preceding the 
harm, (a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by 
the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care and 
(b) the defendant (i) knows of the plaintiff's 
situation and realizes the helpless peril involved 
therein; or (ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation 
and has reason to realize the peril involved there-
in, or (iii) would have discovered the plaintiff's 
situation and thus had reason to realize the plain-
tiff's helpless peril had he exercised the vigilance 
which it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, 
and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence his then 
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~'Xisting ability to avoid harn1ing the plaintiff." 
In referring to the above quoted Section as adopted 
and approved by the Case Law of Utah, our Supreme 
( 'ourt in tlte L!ompton case, supra, stated: 
"That section deals with situations where the 
plaintiff is unable to avoid the consequences of 
lt(·r own negligence or what is often referred to 
as 'inPxtricable peril', and by reason thereof, the 
d<>fendant alone has the last clear chance to avert 
an injury to the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff is 
thus in a position of inextricable peril the defend-
ant is liable either (1) if the defendant knows 
the plaintiff's situation and realizes or has reason 
to realize her helpless peril, or (2) in the case 
where a duty exists toward the plaintiff, if in the 
exercise of reasonable vigilance the defendant 
should have discovered the plaintiff's helpless 
situation in time to avoid injury. But this is so 
only if the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest · 
and plaintiff is thereafter unable by the exercise ~·,, 
of reasonable vigilance and care to avoid the 
injury herself." 
Let us then for a moment consider the case here 
before the court in the light of said Section 479 as said 
Section has been interpreted by this Court. There, of 
course, can be no question but that plaintiff is entitled 
to have the case submitted to the jury under plaintiff's 
theory of the case, with instructions embodying the 
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, if under the evidence 
as construed most favorably to the plaintiff the jury 
might reasonably find the facts to be such as to permit 
the application of that doctrine to the case. 
In order to emphasize the applicability of the 
10 
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doctrine of la~t clear chance to this case, we shall apply 
step by step the testimony and evidence presented to 
the tests laid down in Section 47~) of the Restatement of 
Torts above referred to. 
1. The fir~ t part of the Rule assun1es that the 
plaintiff had himself negligently subjected himself to a 
risk of harm frorn the defendant's subsequent negligence. 
From the verdict rendered by the jury in returning ver-
dicts of "no cause of action" both upon the plaintiff's 
complaint and upon defendant's counterclaim, it appears 
definite that the jury considered the plaintiff was guilty 
of some negligence. 
2. The next test as defined by said Section as con-
strued by this Court, is that the plaintiff's negligence 
has come to rest and the plaintiff is thereafter unable 
to avoid harm to himself by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance and care. The plaintiff testified that as he 
drove his tractor out from the driveway and inched it 
toward the highway at not to exceed one and one-half 
miles per hour, as soon as he got out far enough so he 
could see, he saw the defendant's truck coming from the 
north, about 325 feet away, and he immediately put on 
the brakes and shut off the gas by shutting down the 
lever and then grabbed the hand brake and pulled it 
back and stood up on the foot brake to hold the tractor 
from going further forward; that by the time this could 
be done the defendant's truck had reached a point 125 
feet away from him and was bearing down upon him at 
a speed in excess of 40 miles per hour; that there was no 
time to change gears or back up, and in standing with 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his foot on the foot brake to hold the tractor from going 
forward, he was practically helpless (R. 52, 53, 74, 75). 
During the interval from the time the defendant's truck 
WUH 1 ~;, ft>et or more from the point of impact until the 
t i HIP of impact the plaintiff's tractor was at a standstill 
at a point with the front wheel approximately 5 feet 
onto thP concrete, which would place the wheel approxi-
lltatt>ly 5 feet west of the center line of the highway. 
CPrtainly under the conditions indicated,with the plain-
tiff, a man of 65 years of age, sitting upon a heavy, 
unmaneuverable tractor, the conclusion is inescapable 
that plaintiff was in a position of "inextricable peril" 
from which he could not save himself within the period 
of time available to him. 
This Court has set forth the next test under two 
alternatives, so that if either is applicable, then the case 
comes within the Last Clear Chance Doctrine. These two 
alternatives are: 
(a) The defendant knows the plaintiff's situation 
and realizes or has reason to realize his helpless peril, or 
(b) In the case where a duty exists toward the 
plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable vigilance the 
defendant should have discovered the plaintiff's helpless 
situation in time to avoid injury. 
The evidence which the jury could have found to be 
true in this case was sufficient to have brought the mat-
ter under either or both of said alternatives. We will 
consider these alternatives separately as follows: 
1. The defendmnt knows the plaintiff's situation and 
12 
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;.. 
realize::; or has reason to rea/i.ze his helpless peril. 
The defendant's own testimony brings the case 
within the fir:::;t alternative. The defendant testified 
that when he first saw the tractor on which plaintiff was 
riding that the front wheel of the tractor was two or 
three feet west of the oil portion of the west side of the 
highway, traveling east (R. 150); that at the tin1e of the 
impact the tractor was two or three feet west of the 
center of the highway, and that the tractor moved five 
or six feet from the time he first saw it until the time 
of impact (R. 158, 162); that at least one-half of the 
highway plus at least two or three feet was unobstructed 
so that he could have driven around front of the tractor 
and no other cars were coming from the south (R. 159). 
The only evidence in the record as to the speed the 
tractor was traveling was from one to one and one-half 
miles per hour. As a matter of fact, if the tractor did 
travel from a point two or three feet west of the oiled 
portion of the highway to a point two or three feet west 
of the center line of the highway from the time the 
defendant saw it until the time of the impact, then, since 
the one-half of the highway is approximately 10 feet 
wide, the tractor travelled approximately 10 feet from 
the time the defendant says he first saw it until the time 
of the impact, according to his own testimony (R. 150, 
158). At the greatest speed it was testified it was travel-
ling, namely, one and one-half miles per hour the tractor 
would move 2.19 feet per second. If the tractor travelled 
only 6 feet from the time defendant saw it until the 
impact, it would have taken in excess of 2 and one-half 
13 
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~('(·onds to go that distance and during the sa1ne period 
0 I' time at the minimum speed which anyone stated 
<lt·l't·ndant waH traveling, namely 40 miles per hour, 
d<'fendunt would have travelled a distance of 146 feet. 
11PIH'l', his own figures place him not 65 feet away from 
thP plaintiff at the time he first saw the plaintiff's trac-
tor, but at least 146 feet away. Of course, if the tractor 
actually travelled 10 feet from the time defendant first 
saw it, as his t(~stinwny would warrant believing, then 
hi~ distance away from plaintiff would be correspond-
in~dy increased. At the distance, however, of 146 feet, de-
fendant had ample time to stop his vehicle or sufficiently 
slow it down or turn out around the tractor so as to avoid 
the impact and the injury to the plaintiff. There is no 
question that the defendant not only had reason to 
realize plaintiff's peril, but in fact knew of plaintiff's 
peril because he states that the instant he saw the tractor 
he knew it was not going to stop (R. 151). 
2. In the case where a duty exists toward the plain· 
tiff, in the exercise of reasonable vigilance the defemilalnt 
should have discovered the plaintiffs helpless situation 
in time to avoid injury. 
Certainly no one can look at the evidence and deny 
that this case comes within the second alternative, 
namely, that the defendant would have discovered the 
plaintiff's situation and thus had reason to realize plain-
tiff's helpless peril, had he exercised reasonable care 
and vigilance. In this connection we call attention to the 
fact that, as properly instructed by the court, the defend-
ant had a duty to use due care and diligence in keeping 
14 
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a lookout and to actually look for and see all objects 
and things reasonably within the range of his vision 
and which might constitute a hazard; and further, that it 
was his duty to maintain such control over his automobile 
that he would be able to stop or turn to avoid a collision 
with any other vehicle upon the highway reasonably 
within the range of his vision. Under the testimony of 
the plaintiff, he could see the defendant's truck at a 
distance of 325 feet, from his seat 11 feet back of the 
front of the tractor. If this testimony were believed by 
the jury, then it is an incontrovertible fact that the 
defendant could, if he had been looking and keeping a 
proper lookout, have seen the plaintiff and plaintiff's 
tractor at least 325 feet prior to the time of the collision, 
and had he exercised reasonable care and kept his vehicle 
under proper control, he could have stopped long before 
his vehicle collided with the tractor. The Bingham boys 
testified that the vision was clear from a point between 
450 and 600 feet north of the point of impact as one 
looked south down the highway. Calling attention to 
the photograph, Exhibit A., and the fact that the tele-
phone pole to the north of the driveway is 100 feet north 
of the point of impact, such exhibit shows clearly that 
a person who chose to look could clearly see a vehicle 
standing on the culvert at the fence line even before it 
entered the highway or the shoulder of the highway, 
from a point considerably farther than 100 feet from the 
point of impact. Of course, in determining whether the 
last clear chance doctrine is applicable, we have a right 
to assume that the jury would believe the evidence of 
15 
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tlw plaintiff and any other evidence in the light most 
l'avorahle to the plaintiff. Bearing that in mind, there 
ean lu· no question but that the jury could have found 
(and we think they could not properly have found other-
\\'i~(~) that if tl1P defendant had exercised reasonable care 
in k(·(·ping- a proper lookout, and if he had chose to look 
and ~PP what was before him down the highway, he could 
have :-:<•(•n th<· plaintiff's tractor as it slowly moved out 
to\\'ard the hig-hway, at a point when defendant was at 
least :3:2;) feet north of the point of the impact; -and at 
the time plaintiff's tractor came to a stop, when defend-
ant was at least 123 feet away from said tractor, if the 
defendant had chose to look and observe and see what 
was there to see, he had plenty of time to stop or other-
wise control his automobile so as to avoid the collision. 
\Ve therefore submit that there can be no question what-
soever that this alternative portion of the rule is met. 
The final test as set forth in Section 479 of the 
Restatement of Torts, as interpreted by this court, is as 
to whether or not, the evidence having met the previous 
test above enumerated, the defendant was negligent in 
failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence 
his then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff. 
This, of course, was a question for the jury, and the very 
fact that the jury found against the defendant on his 
counterclaim shows that the jury concluded that the 
defendant was in fact negligent, and from the evidence 
before them the jury might very well have found that 
the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable care, would 
have discovered plaintiff's perilous situation, and that 
16 
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after he should have discoyered such perilous situation, 
by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence he could 
have avoided injury to the plaintiff. 
\Ye suggest it should be apparent that, assuming a 
belief of plaintiff's evidence, and the other evidence in 
the case as nwst favorably construed toward the plain-
tiff, no case could ever be found which more clearly falls 
within the doctrine of last clear chance, as enunciated by 
said Section 479 of the Restaten1ent of Torts, and as 
applied by this court in the Compton and other cases 
hereinabove cited. We call attention to the fact that the 
doctrine of last clear chance is more often applicable in 
situations where the vehicle being operated by the plain-
t.iff is a slow moving vehicle, as was the situation in this 
case. See Morby v. Rogers above cited. 
A second application of the doctrine of last clear 
chance is as set forth in Section 480 of the Restatement 
of Torts. It will be observed that Section 479 covers 
generally a situation where the plaintiff has placed him-· 
self in a position of peril from which he cannot extricate 
himself and where the defendant either knows, or by the 
exercise of reasonable prudence and care, should have 
known, of the plaintiff's peril, and thereafter if he had 
known of said peril could, by the exercise of reasonable 
care, have prevented harm to the plaintiff, but the defend-
ant failed to exercise the care necessary to prevent such 
harm; whereas, section 480 refers generally to a situa-
tion where the defendant in fact knew of plaintiff's 
situation and realized or had reason to realize that 
plaintiff was inattentive and, therefore, unlikely to dis-
17 
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eover his peril in time to avoid harm and that defendant 
' is thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with reason-
aLle earP his ability to avoid injury. Said Section 480 
reads as follows: 
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reason-
aLle vigilance could have observed the danger 
ereated by the defendant's negligence in time to 
hav(' avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, 
but only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plain-
tiff's situation, and (b) realized or had reason to 
realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and 
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time 
to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent 
in failing to utilize with reasonable care and com-
petence his then existing ability to avoid harming 
the plaintiff." 
While it is our contention that the case falls squarely 
and clearly under Section 4 79 so that the doctrine of last 
clear chance should have been submitted to the jury 
under that section, we submit that in the light of plain-
tiff's testimony and other evidence in the case, it was 
a matter for the jury to determine as to whether or not 
the doctrine of last clear chance applied under Section 
480 hereinabove quoted, and that the evidence, if the 
jury sought to believe it, would even bring the case_ 
under the last mentioned section. As hereinabove pre-
viously set forth, from the defendant's own testimony 
the jury could conclude that he saw the plaintiff and 
knew of the plaintiff's perilous situation when he was 
a distance of 146 feet from the plaintiff. Defendant 
himself says he was 65 feet from the plaintiff when he 
knew of plaintiff's perilous situation, but the other testi-
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mony with regard to speed and distances place him at 
least 1-lG feet fron1 the plaintiff at that time. As indi-
cated, he further stated that at such time he knew plain-
tiff's tractor was not going to stop. If the testilnony of 
Officer Beardall were to be believed, then the jury might 
have concluded that the plaintiff was in fact looking 
back and a way frmn the road and toward the west as he 
came onto the highway and in1n1ediately prior to the time 
of the accident, so that if the defendant actually saw 
plaintiff as he says he did, and assuming the distances 
as above indicated, then defendant certainly realized or 
had reason to realize that plaintiff was inattentive and 
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid 
the harm. Assuming a belief of the testimony as above 
indicated, the jury surely could have found that the 
defendant knew, or in the language of the court in the 
Compton case "had reason to know" of plaintiff's peril. 
Defendant saw that there was no car coming from the 
opposite direction. It then became a question for the 
jury to determine whether or not, under those conditions, 
~- defendant had a clear chance to avoid injury to the 
plaintiff and negligently failed to do so. 
The instructions requested by the plaintiff relating 
to the doctrine of last clear chance, and particularly the 
instructions nmnbered 13 and 14 (R. 23 & 24) were based 
upon the wording of Sections 479 and 480 of the Restate-
ment of Torts, as interpreted and approved by this 
Court in the Compton and other cases. Plaintiff's coun-
sel endeavored therein to set forth in as clear language 
aR possible a fair statement of that doctrine as so 
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j n t Prp I'Pt P<l. 
\V hile as indicated above, we do not feel it necessary 
to di~<·u~s at length the factual situations in numerous 
,.a~<·~, in addition to the cases already hereinabove cited, 
Wt· <·all the attention of the Court to the Utah cases of 
Uralwm r. Johnson, Hifi Pac. (2d) 230, wherein this 
<·ourt ~tatPd that in a proper case a verdict should be 
di rPdl'd for thP plaintiff under the doctrine of last clear 
c-ltaile<·, and in the re-hearing of that case, which is 
reported at 172 Pac. (2d) 665, the Court stated that: 
"The last clear chance duty is to do what a 
prudent person would have done to avoid the 
accident had he had the opportunity, whatever 
that would be, after he did or should have appre-
ciated the other's peril or approaching peril." 
We submit that on the evidence, this case fell clearly 
and unequivocally within the provisions of said Section 
479 of the Restatement of Torts, so that instructions 
should have been given on the doctrine of last clear 
chance. We submit also that it fell sufficiently within 
the provisions of Section 480, so as to warrant giving 
an instruction on last clear chance on the theory of that 
Section. We urge that the Court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance, as 
requested by the plaintiff, and that such error was 
1naterial and substantial. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO 
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO. 11 AS REGARDS THE DUTY OF A PERSON 
20 
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l\IOV ING A TRACTOR ONTO THE HIGHvVAY. 
Plaintiff subn1itted to the Court and requested that 
it give to the jury his requested instruction No. 11 which 
reads as follows : 
'"The duty imposed upon the plaintiff in mov-
ing his tractor out of the yard and driveway and 
onto the highway was to exercise that degree of 
care which an ordinarily prudent person would 
exercise under similar circumstances. If he did 
exercise such care, then there would be no negli-
gence on his part in connection therewith." 
The court refused to give such instruction. rrhe 
court did, however, give its instruction No. 12, which 
reads as follows : 
''You are instructed that a driver about to 
enter a high\vay from a private road or driveway 
shall yield the right of way to vehicles approach-
ing on said highway, and such driver must use 
reasonable and ordinary care to avoid a collision 
with a vehicle proceeding on said highway." 
\Ve submit that having given instruction No. 12 -
which instruction would place a great burden upon one 
entering the highway to watch for and yield the right 
of way to approaching vehicles, and greatly emphasized 
the duties and obligations of the plaintiff entering the 
highway from a private road,- that under such circum-
stances plaintiff was entitled to have also given to the 
jury the balancing instruction as set forth in plaintiff's 
proposed instruction No. 11. This instruction simply 
sets forth the ordinary rule of negligence, but applies 
such ordinary rule to the facts and circumstances as 
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wen• present in this case and before the jury for its 
consideration. 
WP submit that in fairness to the plaintiff and so 
as not to over-burden the case with instructions in favor 
of defendant and against plaintiff, the plaintiff was 
PntitlPd to have given to the jury his Instruction No. 11, 
which WP submit everyone must admit is a fair statement 
of the law. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE 
PLAINTIFF TO INTRODUCE THE EVIDENCE BY THE 
WITNESS KENNETH J. TANNER AS TO THE STATEMENT 
MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE PRESENCE OF SAID 
TANNER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE COLLISION, 
WITH REGARD TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ACCI-
DENT OCCURRED AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING 
THAT SUCH STATEMENT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF AND INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE IMPEACHING TESTIMONY OF OFFICER 
BEARD ALL. 
The plaintiff testified that the accident occurred in 
the manner as hereinabove previously set forth. Officer 
Beardall testified that in the X-ray room of the Payson 
Hospital, the plaintiff told him that the accident hap-
pened in a different manner, and that he never did see 
the defendant's truck prior to the collision, and that he, 
the plaintiff, was looking back to the west at the time 
of the collision. 
The plaintiff's testimony having thus been im-
peached, the plaintiff offered to prove by the witness 
Tanner, who was the X-ray technician, that at a time 
contemporaneous with the time when Beardall testified 
22 
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the ineon~i~tent ~tatement was Inade, that the plaintiff 
had in fact made a staternent to hiin, Tanner, as to the 
manner in which the accident occurred, which statement 
was entirely consistent with the testimony of the plain-
tiff. The Court refused to permit the witness Tanner 
to testify \vith regard to that inconsistent statement. 
\Vhile we nmst admit that there is not a uniformity 
of agreement among the court as to the admissibility 
of such evidence to rebut i1npeaching testimony, never-
theless the rule is recognized in many jurisdictions and 
by respectable authority. The rule is recognized in Utah 
by this court, although the court states that it should 
he applied with extreme caution. (See Hilt·a v. Packard, 
10 Utah 78, 37 Pac. 86; State v. Carrington, 15 Utah 480, 
50 Pac. 326; Ewing v. J( eith, 16 Utah 312, 52 Pac. 4; 
Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah 59, 272 Pac. 229. 
Where the rule is recognized, such testimony is 
permitted if it is made reasonably soon after the event 
and at a time prior to litigation, and at a time when 
there was little likelihood that the party making the 
statement would have reason to fabricate a story. All 
of these conditions, of course, applied as regards the 
statement, concerning which the plaintiff sought to have 
testimony introduced. In addition thereto, we suggest 
that no more favorable situation could ever arise for 
invoking exception to the rule against self-serving state-
ments than was present in this case. We say this by 
-- reason of the fact that the statement which we sought to 
prove was made to Mr. Tanner at a time very close to 
--· the time of the alleged statement made to Officer 
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Beardall, and, furthermore, the statement allegedly made 
to Officer Beardall was, according to him, made in the 
prP~Pll<'(' of the said Mr. Tanner. Certainly it would 
~l'<'ttt lti~hly improbable that the plaintiff would make a 
~tatPtnPnt one minute to Mr. Tanner concerning the 
manner in whi<'h the accident happened, and in the next 
minute make another statement to Officer Beardall, but 
in the pr<'~erwe of the same _jlr. Tanner, to the effect that 
the aC'eident occurred in an entirely different manner. 
t:nder these circumstances, we submit it was error on 
the part of the court to refuse to permit the witness 
Tanner to testify as to the statement made by the plain-
tiff with regard to the manner in which the accident 
occurred. 
We respectfully call the attention of the court to the 
annotation appearing in 140 A.L.R., commencing at 
page 21. 
CONCLUSION 
We urge that the Court erred in the manners as 
hereinabove set forth and that the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment entered thereon should be reve·rsed 
and set aside and the case remanded to the district court 
for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
A. U. MINER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
AppeUant. 
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